Archive for the ‘Decision theory’ Category

The Global Crisis in Economic Theory

Tuesday, May 5th, 2009

Economist John Kay has an interesting article in the FT about the Global Crisis in Economic Theory.   Marketers have long held to the view that marketing only exists to the extent that the assumptions of economics are false.  Nice to see an economist agreeing with this.

“Since the 1970s economists have been engaged in a grand project. The project’s objective is that macroeconomics should have microeconomic foundations. In everyday language, that means that what we say about big policy issues – growth and inflation, boom and bust – should be grounded in the study of individual behaviour. Put like that, the project sounds obviously desirable, even essential. I confess I was long seduced by it.

Most economists would claim that the project has been a success. But the criteria are the self-referential criteria of modern academic life. The greatest compliment you can now pay an economic argument is to say it is rigorous. Today’s macroeconomic models are certainly that.

But policymakers and the public at large are, rightly, not interested in whether models are rigorous. They are interested in whether the models are useful and illuminating – and these rigorous models do not score well here.

Indeed, at an early stage of the project Robert Lucas, one of its principal architects, who received the Nobel prize for his contributions, developed what is known as the Lucas critique. He argued that ordinary standards of statistical validity should not be applied to the project’s predictions. According to his colleague Thomas Sargent, Lucas was concerned that such tests rejected “too many really good models”.

Economists, like physicists, have been searching for a theory of everything. If there were to be such an economic theory, there is really only one candidate, based on extreme rationality and market efficiency. Any other theory would have to account for the evolution of individual beliefs and the advance of human knowledge, and no one imagines that there could be a single theory of all human behaviour. Not quite no one: a few deranged practitioners of the project believe that their theory really does account for all human behaviour, and that concepts such as goodness, beauty and truth are sloppy sociological constructs.

But these people discredit themselves by opening their mouths. That people respond rationally to incentives, and that market prices incorporate information about the world, are not terrible assumptions. But they are not universal truths either. Much of what creates profit opportunities and causes instability in the global economy results from the failure of these assumptions. Herd behaviour, asset mispricing and grossly imperfect information have led us to where we are today.”

(Hat tip:  SP)

What would Jesus bet?

Sunday, March 29th, 2009

Alec Wilkinson has a nice profile in the 30 March 2009 edition of The New Yorker magazine of poker-meister [tag]Chris Ferguson[/tag].  The son of a mathematician mother and a game-theorist father, Ferguson seems particularly adept at applying game theory to poker.  

I had not realized until reading this article that, despite the threats of lawmakers and politicians, the legal position for [tag]online poker[/tag] in the US is so strong.  Arguably, the various laws against online gambling only preclude gambling on “games of chance”, or betting by spectators.  Online players of poker, a game of skill and not chance, are thus exempt, at least by one interpretation of the various laws.  That neither US State nor Federal Governments have yet prosecuted people for playing or facilitating online [tag]poker[/tag] would seem to support this interpretation.

Decision-making for hexapods

Monday, April 14th, 2008

Statistician Dennis Lindley wrote a book called “Making Decisions” which included the sentence: “The main conclusion [of this book] is that there is essentially only one way to reach a decision sensibly.” He justifies this claim by saying that, “any deviation from the precepts is liable to lead the decision-maker into procedures which are demonstrably absurd — or as we shall say, incoherent.” (page vii, second edition, 1985). There follows an account of maximum-expected utility decision theory, which is justified in the standard way using Dutch Book arguments (considerations of certain infinite gambles).

I have never trusted these Dutch Book arguments, first because we all live in a finite world, and so games in which one party is guaranteed to win after an infinitely-large time strike me as selling pie-in-the-sky. Everyone is rich eventually when investing in a Ponzi scheme, also. And second, gambling is such a socially- and culturally-embedded practice that I cannot possibly conceive how it could be used to justify decision-making procedures claiming universal validity.  The statistician Cosma Shalizi over at Three-Toed Sloth has a nice parody of the advice of decision-theory ideologues here:

A: Hey, you over there, the one walking! You’re doing it wrong.
B: Excuse me?
A: You’re only using two feet! You should keep at least three of your six in contact with the ground at all times.
B: …
A: Look, it’s easily proved that’s the optimal way to walk. Otherwise you’d be unstable, and if you were walking past a Dutchman he could kick one of your legs with his clogs and knock you over and then lecture you on how to make pancakes.
B: What? Why a Dutchman?
A: You can’t trust the Dutch, they’re everywhere! Besides, every time you walk it’s really just like running the gauntlet at Schiphol.
B: It is?
A: Don’t change the subject! Walking like that you’re actually sessile!
B: I don’t seem to be rooted in place…
A: It’s a technical term. Look, it’s very simple, these are all implications of the axioms of the theory of optimal walking and you’re breaking them all. I can’t get over how immobile you are, walking like that.
B: “Immobile”?
A: Well, you’re not walking properly, are you?
B: Your theory seems to assume I have six legs.
A: Yes, exactly!
B: I only have two legs. It doesn’t describe what I do at all.
A: It’s a normative theory.
B: For something with six legs.
A: Yes.
B: I have two legs. Does your theory have any advice about how to walk on two legs?
A: Could you try crawling on your hands and knees?